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POWER TO INTERCEPT, MONITOR AND SURVEIL:
CYBERSURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN I NDIA
-p Arun

Abstract
Th~ aftermath ofmajor umJr attacks in the twmty-first century unleashed smous
canarm and unprecedmted challenges to ucu rity across the g lobe. Similar to
sron-at other countries, India's respome to challenges introduced sn J"a/ innovations
in the legal and technological realm, which led to the emergmct of data-driven
governance through surveillance i.e. , cyb"surveillance. A greater thrust towards
data-driven governance ltd to unrelenting expansion and frenetic search for alibis
to control ever /arg" ar(aI ofsociety and people. It is a significant metamorphosis

in the nature ofsurvei/lance at this juncture where there is great~r thrust towards
normalisation ofaceptional power to intNUpl, monitor and sum ei' in mundane

lives. Now, surveillance is regarrkd not just as a technological emity. but also as a
grand narrative which has accreted as a cultural entiry to prevent crimes, reduce
fiar and insecurity and so on. However, the production ofsuch discourse masques
the corrosive efficts and corrupt uses ofpervasive surveillance power. Here the greater
aggregation ofdata, accompanied by its clandestine nature, raises .;erious questions
over its existence and profound implications on the nature ofdemocracy. Therefore,
this article aims to delineate the power to intercept, monitor and surveil by exploring
mass cybtrJurveillance apparatus to face existential challenges, follo wed by analysing
its counter efficts on tkmocracy, constitutionalism and rulL oflaw.

1. INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 2016, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, the then President of India
in his inaugural speech at the Counter Terrorism Conference 20 16 in Jaipur
stated that, "terrorism is undoubtedly the single gravest threat that humaniry
is facing today. Terrorism is a global th reat which poses an unprecedented
challenge to all nations ... [here an] important aspect of counter-terrorism
108
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srto.regy is capacity building to prevent attacks through intelligence collection

and co/Jation, development of technological

capabilities, raising of special

(orces and enactment of special laws. " 1 He poignantly indicated nor mereJy
the graveness of the trepidation, but also the counter actions needed to address
that graveness by all nation-states in twenty-first centuty.
In last twO decades, there had been rapid technological developments in this
information age. It gave rise to unprecedented challenges due to the sporadic
rise in terrorism, which is equipped with new tools and techniques in this global
communication network. Simultaneously, the thriving cyber space also gave rise
to profound threats to cybersecurity. Now the threats are not merely confined
to physical spaces; rather they have penetrated into virtual space. Due to the
professed legitimate needs the Indian government brought innovations in legal
and technological regime. Unlike conventional surveillance, here new methods
were employed by harnessing larger sets of data i.e. , big data. ' Following the
West, these innovations marked emergence of cybersurveillance in India.
Numetous scholars have tried to explore the metamorphic change in surveillance
process. In late 1980s, Roger Clarke coined the term dataveillance, describing it
as "systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of
the actions or communicatio ns of one or more perso ns. "J Later, Lawrence Lessig

inttoduced digital surveillance as "the ptocess by which some form of human
activity is analyzed by a computer, according to some specified rule ... [having] the
critical feature ... [wherein] a computer is sorting data for some followup review
by some human. '" For Mark Andrejevic, it is big data surveillance, because it is

Presicknt ofIndia inaugurates Countn'- urrorism Conftrma-2016. PI B availabk athtrp:/ /
pib.nic.in/ newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid =136023 (last visi ted Sep 13.2016).

2

Margaret Hu distinguishes rcaciirionaJ intelligence gathering methods as 'small data
surveillance' and newly emerging modern data-driven im elligence methods as 'big data
cybersurveillance.' Margare[ Hu, Smail Data Survti/Jana v. Big Data Cybtnurveillana , 42
PEr PEIVINE LAw REVI EW 773,776 (20 15).

3

Roger Clarke, Information Trchnology and Datavdlanc<, 31 (5) COM M UNiCAlIQNS OF 1HE
ACM (1988).

4

Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 209 (Crea[i ve Commons, 200~) .
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"im perative . . . to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise it is harder to
consistently and reliably discern useful patterns. '" Following them, Margaret
Hu uses the term cybersurveillance to describe the phe omenon when the
surveillance states "increasingly rely upon the aggregation of data-driven systems
for population management through tools such as bulk metadata collection
and mass data tracking; digitized identity management programs; a1gorith mdriven risk-based assessments."6 She regards it as a cybersurveillance state that
adapts "big data governance tools and philosophies."7 It primarily works on
pre-emptive policy rationale, and this is justified for emerging modern crime
and counterterrorism.
This article will explore the gravity of the trepidation ancl the developments
made in the domain of cybersurveillance in India. Consequently explore the
existential challenges to be followed by counter effects of deploying surveillance
power on democracy, constitutionalism and rule of law. The section II will
discuss how surveillance has evolved in different political contexts and the
legitimate needs. It comprises significant innovations that occurred in both
legal measures and technological mechanisms of surveillance in India. The
legal measures contain provisions ranging from extraordi nary and ordinary
situations. Whereas quest for new surveilling space ended with technological
innovations in surveillance methods, making the government technologically
competent to control and monitor its population. These profound changes
bring out dilemma between 'Security' and ' Liberty,' as it needs to be 'balanced'
between each other or 'traded off' one over the other, as discussed in Section
3. It will specifically analyse the challenges and implications of surveillance in
Indian democracy, of it being an appropriate and legitimate means ro defend
our freedoms, or often-corrosive while being operational. It will look into the
historic Puttaswamy judgement on issues related to surveillance and privacy.
In short, this article is an effort to understand and conceptualize the trajectory
5

6

Supra note 2, at 778.

Margaret Hu. From the National Suroeillana State to the Cyberrurveillance Stau. 13 ANN UAl
REVIEW OF

7

LAw

AND SOCIAL SCI ENCE

161 .176(2017).

Supra note 2. at 163.
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of continual reforms, innovations, exponential advances in cybersurveillance
techniques occurring since 2000s. It needs ro be pointed out that this paper
will not be delineating cybercrimes against individuals, corporates, etc., and it
will circumscribe itself to an examination of cybersurveillance infrastructure
and its profound challenges and implications on democracy in India.
2. POLITICS, LEGALITIES AND MECHANISMS OF

CYBERSURVEILLANCE IN INDIA
From time immemorial, there have been various techniques to moniror, observe,
and control population. However, the twenry-first century cyberspace is more
complex, and it consists of ceaseless interactions between people, software
and services which are supported by worldwide distribution of information
and communication technology devices and networks. These following
developments in technological realm have nOt only transformed human
lives and ameliorated them, but also penetrated as a dominant organizing
practice. However, such practice turned out as surveillance, which dramatically
influenced ubiquirous observation and moniroring everybody's movements
and actions. According to David Lyon, "surveillance is the purposeful, routine,
systematic, and focused attention paid to personal details, for the sake of control,
entitlement, management, influence or protection.'" He further argues that it
may be direct, face-to-face or it may be technologically mediated. However,
the latter is growing fast and such ubiquitous and ambiguous proliferation
needs methodological understanding, because of its expansion, penetration,
intensification and integration in human lives. Also, its varied roles in different
conditions result in diverse outcomes. Undoubtedly, it is apparent that
surveillance has become a part of our human sociery and has become one of
the human organizational and epistemological endeavours in everybody's lives.'
8

David Lyon "Surv~illonce Society" Lecture at Canada Talk for Festival del Diritto. Piacenza,
!talia, 2008 available at http: //www.festi valdeid iritto.it/ 2008/ pdf/interventiidavid_lyon.
pdf (last visited Sep 13, 2016); David Lyon, SURVEIllANCE SWDI ES: AN O VERVI EW, 13- 18
(2007).

9

Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samaras, Introduction: Surveillance and democracy: An
Umm lrd Relatiomhip, in SURVEI llANCE AND DEM txJlAO',3 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas
Samatas eds., 2010)
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In February 2017, Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi contrasted
the rise of terrorist attacks in the BJP-led NDA regime with that during
the UPA regime. He further questioned, "How are the terrorists funded ,
considering the entire money transaction business is under the jurisdiction of
the Government of India. Why can't Prime Minister Mo i keep surveillance
on these transactions. "'· Since 2000, surveillance is regarded as a strong and
viable mechanism used by successive regimes ro counter terrorism. A major
setback occurted when there were major terrorist attacks'l In the beginning of
the twenry-first century, leading ro a precarious situation around the world .
During this time, government introduced a series of reforms in anti-terror legal
regimes through which it acquired new techniques of surveillance in the form
of keeping tabs on electronic traces of its population to counter terrorism. The
upcoming sections would explore the interception and surveillance laws in a
different poli tical context.
2.1 Surveillance, Terrorism and Extra-Ordinary Circumstances
The model legislation for interception of wire, electronic or o ral communication
follows from Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act 1999 , which
originated ro deter organized crime. l2 After 2001 Parliament attack, those
provis ions penetrated 13 into Prevention ofTerrorism Act, 2002, which permitted

10 Jammu A rmy camp attack: Congm' hilS back with Modi vi"'o, T HE

H INDU

Ua nuary 14,

20 18), available amrrp:llwww.thehindu. com/news/ nationaIljamITIu-army-ca mp-artack-

congress-hits-back-with-mod i-video/asticle22754621.ece (last visitL-d February 13, 2018).
11

T he September 11, 200 I, terrorist anack in US shook the en l ire wo rld, and it led
to adop ting UNSC Resolution 1373 on September 28,200 1, mandating concerted
international effo rt against global terror networks. Later, attack o n Indian Parliament

buildi ng on December 13, 2001. Al l stirred up to enact new anti-terror regimes to counter
modern terror and its global networks . Again , on 26/ 11 (2008) cerro rise attacks in Mumbai
shook [he governmem, which led CO maj or developments in surveillance technologies .

12
13

s.1 4 MCOCA.
In Match 2002, Joint sitting MCOCA was projected as the model fo r the proposed
legislatio n and its success was puc forward as a reaso n for emulati f' g che act. Hence , the

interception provis ions POTA (ss.36-48 ) emulated MCOCA (ss. 13-1 6) . Ujjwal K.
Singh, Mapping Anti-Terror Legal Regimes in India, in G IOBALhn-TERlURISM LAw AND
POUCl, 439 (Victor Y. Ramraj et aI. eds., 2nd edn ., 2012).
112
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interception of communications." Here, despite the presence of specific
procedures, there have been procedural lapses. Ujjwal Kumar Singh observes
how POTA's interception provision was under litmus test in parliament arrack
case. In State v. Mohammad Afoal, major evidence was built largely through
the interception of telephonic conversations and call data records. The POTA
court and even Delhi High Court upheld that the "Section 43 of POTA
dealing with interception in case of emergency situation and tule 419A of the
Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, are virtually the same [and] no prejudice would
be caused if POTA provision were added or not, qua the right of the accused
pertaining ro interception."I' Such a position meant that the provisions of
interception are parimateria, where the laws are concerned with same matter;
hence, the provision of the one could be interpreted with reference ro the other
for the purpose of facilitating uniformity in law. 16 Arguably, it meant that the
laws concerning public emergency and safety are equivalent ro those concerning
terrorism. It shows the fluidity of interception laws for different circumstances.
The questions of its legality and admissibility of intercepted telephone were
seriously dealt with in Navjot Sandhu v. State (N C. T ofDelhi) (2005) II SCC
600, and the Supreme Court held that the evidence could not be excluded due
to its illegality or admissibility. It shows the state of exception and further raises
serious questions on operational functioning of surveillance and tule of law.
Later, in 2014, apex court in Anvar PV v. PK Basheer 10 SCC 473 overruled
this decision. It held that electronic record must satisfY the conditions and
comply with certification requirement for admissibility as electronic evidence
(s.65A and s.65B of Indian Evidence Act).
While POTA was repealed in 2004, its perilous features of surveilling techniques
were maintained by incorporating them in Unlawfol Activities Prevention Act
1967 [2008, 2012], provisions relating to the interception of telephone and
14

s.36-48 POTA.

15
16

State v. Mohd.Afoal and Ors (2003) 71 DR] 178.
Ujjwal Kumar Singh, Surveillance Regimes in Contemporary India, in SURVEIllANCE, CCJUmEJ>.
TERIDRISM AND COM P AFAllVE CONSllllfllONAllSM , 42-46 (Ferga! Francis Davis, et al. eds ..
2014)
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electronic communications. 17 However, such incorporation was partial because
they omitted the crucial procedural safeguards available in POTA. A major
innovation in UAPA 2008 amendment was inclusion of power to prevent and
fo r coping with terrorist activities under s.51A. It gives powers to the state on
the suspicion of being engaged in terrorism: 1) To "freeze, seize or attach funds
and other financial assets or economic resources," 2) To "prohibit any individual
or entiry from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or
related services," 3) To "prevent the entry into or the transit through India
of individuals." 18 This was a major innovation in the legal fram ework, which
equipped and empowered the government not merely to intercept telephonic
conversations, but also to scrutinize financial transactions and ban suspicious
actiVItIes.

Here, in order to protect and provide adequate safeguards for extraordinary
provisions from any potential misuse of interception rovisions , POTA
conta in ed ins titution of a review comm ittee. 19 However, the Central
government failed to set up a Review Committee until several months after the
Act came into force . Apart from the institution of a Review Committee, there
was another safeguard under s.48 of POTA, which requi red that an annual
report of interceptions be placed before the central or state legislatures giving
a full account of the number of applications for interception and reasons for
their acceptance or rejection. It provides public scrutiny an d, thus, a potential
check on government arbitrariness. However, it was absent solely because
of political will which was not activated.'o Unlike POTA, UAPA does not
have any provision of Review Committee or legislative review, which makes
it unaccountable and non-transparent from any public scrutiny of potential
abuse of power.

17 s.46 UAPA.
18

Supra note 13. at 440; Supra note 16. at 42-46.

19

POTA s.40. s.46 and s.60.

20

Ujjwal K. Singh. The State. Democracy and Anti-Tetror Laws in India. 153-154 (2007).
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2,2 Surveillance, Exceptions and Ordinary Circumstances

"... where they got these drugs from.
From a Web site.
Whats the Web site?
The Silk Road, " the roommate said
Whats the Silk Road?"Jared asked....
"You can buy any drug imaginable on the site, ""
- Nick Bilton in American Kingpin (2017)
Apart from those extra-ordinary circumstances discussed earlier. there are some
other circumstances in normal times such as - public emergency. public safety.
public order. investigation or prevention of crimes and so on - for which the
state can get access ro information. Prior ro the twenty-first century. there
were laws that used ro govern the wiretap and interception permits given by
the government. The staturory law thar authorizes the state ro intercept was
elaborated under s.5 (I) and (2) of the Indian Telegraph Act. 188 5 (hereafter
TA). This was almost a century before the interception provisions in anti-terror
laws. Although its origins were during the colonial times. these provisions
are extensively utilised in modern electronic society. Even Code of Criminal
Procedure. 1973. has technologically neutral provision under s.91 and s.92.
which empowers the state ro summon for the production of any document,
parcel or other things. 21 The law enforcement officials frequently use this
provision and approach private sector organisations to get access to the electronic
data .
Telephone tapping and snooping became a grave concern in India. During
the tumultuous period of the 1980s and 1990s. there were major scandalous
revelations about the involvement of several politicians in snooping. Political
snooping even led ro the resignation of Ramakrishna Hegde from Chief
Ministership of Karnataka in 1988. 22 Here, lack of oversight institution on
21

Both s.91 and s.92 are nor similar, because the former is nor subject of judicial oversight
and they can only access payload information or metadata, whereas the latter is subject
[Q judicial oversigh t in order to get access to communication data.

22

Prabhu Chawla. Scandalous rwelatiom.

INDIA TODAY

(February 28, 1991). available at
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state surveillance remained a major concern_" In 1996, in People's Union of
Civil Liberties v. Union ofIndia, the Supreme Court retreated from providing
'prior judicial scrutiny' and declared that it is up to the central government ro
lay down 'procedural safeguards and precautions' from unlawful surveillance.
However, it directed and placed restrictions on the class of burea ucrats who
could authorise interception and ordered the creation of a 'review committee'
so that the right ro privacy is protected. After PUCL judgement, it was
incorporated under 419(A) of the Indian Telegraph Rules (1951 )_ Later, in 2010
Radia tapes, controversy again raised eyebrows over the surveillance mechanisms
with defunct safeguards. Consequently, some incremental changes were made
in 419(A) Telegraph Rules in 2014, where an inclusion was made in fortnight
review along with the list of interception orders of non-emergency cases (issued
by the competent authoriry); it now also includes emergency cases (issued by
other than competent authoriry) ro the executive."
Yet, there are several allegations and incidents of phone
keep occurring despite the guidelines_ Among numerous
recent incident is when Lucknow ciry police carried out
accessed call data records of over 10,000 phones ro nab tw

tapping, and these
instances, the most
hone tapping and
men who dumped

potaroes at prominent locations across the ciry, including on the roads that
lead to Chief Minister Yogi Adiryanath's house. It was alleged that those men
were affiliated to Samajwadi Parry (rival opposition parry in Uttar Pradesh).25It
does reflect the failure of a proper procedural framework to provide safeguards
h[rp: / l ind ia (oda y. in today. i 01sto ryI secret -cepo rt - by -cb i-co nrai ns-s hocki ng-derai Is-o f·
phone-tapping-ordered-by-congressi-govtsII 1317946.html (La" visited on February
3, 2017).
23

To regulate, oversee and examine unlawful surveillance, the Umted States has Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (I 97S), and the United Kingdom has Investigatory Powers
Tribunal (200S) and Intelligence and Securiry Committee of Parliament. In India, both

legislative and judicial oversight is nO[ present.
24

25

Rule 13, Indian Telegraph Rules (Ist Amendment of2014), Rules 201 4.

Two Samajwadi Party activists heldfor throwingpotaroes on Lucknou. roads. Akhilesh justifies

act, INDIAN ExP 1E5S, Oanuary 13, 20 IS), availabk at http://www.newindi anexpress.com/
na rion/ 20 181jao / 131two-samajwadi - parry-activis [s~ held-fo r~ [hrowi ng-po[awes-o nlucknow-roads-akhilesh-justifies-act-1752S35.html (Last visited nn April 25, 20IS).
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from unlawful surveillance and protect privacy from the corrupt uses of power.
Apart from these, there is an array of other legislations, which enable the state
to get access to several other rypes of data.
In the wake of twenry-first century, rise of technology not only eased the
way of doing business and communications, but also altered the definition
of crimes, as they were being committed via cyber space. Now, preventing
and combating terrorism is not merely confined within the conventional
battleground; rather, it greatly involves increased resources and effort devoted
to monitoring the virtual battleground. 26 Philip Seib and Dana Janbek call it
as a shift from caves and onto the web. The present truism is Internet allows
fast, spontaneous and inexpensive medium for dissemination of even complex
information to diverse constituencies, ranging from the potential recruit to
prospective partners in terrorist enterprises. 27 It has created complex situation
with imminent governance issues surrounding information and communication
technology. It is such an open, democratic, diffused, decentralized interoperable
communication network in which regulations are few in number and which
also provides easier access and provides safe haven to operate and function in
virtual space. 28 The most challenging aspects of this expansion of terrorism via
cyberspace are because virtual space gives much resilience to their existence.
Under this scenario, the government made laws to intercept and decrypt any
information in the cyber space under s.69 of the Information Technology Act
2000 (hereafter ITA). With the advancements in technologies, nature of crimes
in cyber space got more sophisticated; hence, the IT Act was amended in 2008

26

Jessica Stern and John Berger in their book explore how ISIS mounred a systematic and
devastating campaign for heans and minds on social media, most visibly and noisily on
Twitter. See Jessica Stern and J M Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror (2015).

27

See Bruce Hoffman. The New Media. urrorism. and the Shaping ofGlcbal Opinion. in
INSIDE TERRORISM 174-197 (2006); Philip M. Seib & Dana M. Janbek. GLOBAL TERRORISM
AND NEW MEDIA: TH E PosT-AL QAEDA GENERATION 22-42 (201l).

28

Paul J Smith. THE TEm:JI<SM AHEAD: CONFroN1ING TAANSNAlIONAL V,OlENCE IN lIHE TWENlYFII<S'TCENTVRY69-72 (2008); Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek. GlOBALTEm:JI<SM AND NEW
MEDIA: T HE Parr-ALQAEDA GENERA1ION. 59 (2010).
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(was notified on October 2009). However, these amendments also came as an
aftermath of26111 Mumbai terror arracks in 2008, which led to the widening
of the surveillance power of the state. It gave the power to not just intercept,
monitor and decrypt any information , as it was present under s.69, but also
gave the power to monitor and collect traffic data under s.69B and block public
access to data under s.69A.
While the older version of s.69 in ITA 2000 had only five subject marrers, such
as - I) sovereignry or integrity of India, 2) securiry of the State, 3) friendly
relations with foreign Stales, 4) public order, 5) preventing incitement to the
commission of any cognizable offence. However, the amended s. 69 , along
with the old subject marrers, incremented twO more subjects - 6) defence of
India, 7) investigation of any offence. It essentially provi es systemic or realtime access to communications 2 ' Arguably, there is greater normalisation of
exceptions beyond public emergency and safery. Unlike TA , where surveillance
can be evoked only during public emergency or safery, ITA needs no such
grounds to intercept data. These major innovations broaden the interception
permits in comparison to earlier laws. Evolving cybercrimes became a major
concern; hence, the Standing Commirree on IT (Amendment) Bill, 2006,
observed that" [iJ n view of the emerging kind of cyber offences ... interception
should be allowed for prevention of any cognisable offence in addition to the
already prescribed grounds. " Therefore, they suggested applying the existing
emergency ptovision of interception in Telegraph Act to combat proliferation of
cybercrimes. They evoked "permanent state of emergency" for which it "did not
require that extraordinary conditions of public emergency" anymore. Arguably,
there is greater normalisation of emergency provisions, by applying emergency
laws in ordinary circumstances such as prevention of crime and offences. As
Giorgio Agamben says, "the state of exception in contemporary politics (is
turning our) more and more the dominant paradigm of government."30 Such
exceptions acquire legitimacy due to the nature and seriousness of crimes
29

Systemic or real-rime access means delivery of data immediately after collection without
any delay. Most commonly used in navigation or tracking (e.g. , Cab location in Uber).

30

Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. 9 (tr.• Kevin Attell (2005) .
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in this cyber world. However, (here is a thin line of difference between the
laws pertaining to penal provisions For non-compliance, to inrerceprion and
monitoring requests. While TA contains civil liability, whereas the ITA carries
criminalliabiliry"1 making the latter much more serious.

"The telegraph, telephone, radio, and especially the computer have put
everyone on the globe within earshot - at the price ofour privacy. It
may feel like we're performing an intimate act when, sequestered in our
rooms and cubicles, we casually use our cell phones and computers to
trammit our thoughts, confidences, business plam, and even our money.
But clever eavesdroppers, and sometimes even not-so-clever ones, can
hear it all. We think we're whispering, but we're really broadcasting. "

r

- Steven Levy in Crypto (2001)32
Pursuant to the ITA 2008 amendment, there were two crucial rules were
notified to remove the ambiguity in the legal regime in the state's surveillance
in virtual space.
a)

IT Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and
Decryption ofInformation Rules, 2009 [hereafter s.69 Rules 2009J.

b)

IT Procedure and Safeguardfor Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data
or Information Rules, 2009[hereafter s.69B Rules 2009J.

The former comprises intercepting, monitoring and dectypting payload data,
i.e., the essential or actual data (message, text, images, sound, voice, and so
on). In contrast to this, the latter comprises rules to monitor and collect traffic
data defined under s.69B of ITA 2009. Here, the traffic data means data of
"communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type
of underlying service or any other information. "33 In short, it is nothing but
metadata surveillance, but it would be issued only to matters related to cyber
31

5.15 TA and 5.69B(4) ITA

32

Steven Levy, Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government Saving Privacy in the Digital
Age (Penguin, 200 1).

33

5.69B Explanation (ii) ITA.
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security.'" Despite different operational usage of s.69 R les 2009 and s.69B
Rules 2009, where the former is for security purpose in general,35 and the latrer
is for cyber security incidents in particular,36 both these rules contain a few
similarities. First, the rules prohibit collecting, monitoring, intercep ting and
decrypting information without any authorisation, and it contains an oversight
committee (same as 419A TA Review Committee). Second, the intermediaries
are supposed to provide all kinds of facilities, cooperation and assistance.
The global threats concerning ro cyber security has become a serious matter. In
2017, there had been two major global ransomware, ~nnacry and Petya attack,
which created havoc actoss the globe, and even India. Apart f-r om this, the official
government sites are also prone to hacking, defacement and even compromising
of data. According to K J Alphons (Minister of State for Electronics and IT)
a "total of 22,207 Indian websites including 114 govern ent websites were
hacked during April 2017 to January 2018 ," as reported and tracked by the
CERT-In.37 With regard to the rise of cyber security vulnerabilities s.69B and
s.69B Traffic Data Rules, 2011, were introduced to access and monitor the flow
ofinformation. 38 In the 2000s, due to the growing concerns over vulnerabilities,

34

5.69B(1 ) ITA says "the Central Government may, to enhance cyber security and for
identification, analysis and prevention of intrusion or spread of .:ompurer conraminam
in the counery."

35

Rule 25 in s.69 Interception and Monitoring Rules 2009.

36

Rule 10 in s.69B Traffic Data Rules 2009.

37

Over 22,000 Indian websites hacked between Apr 2017-Jan 2018: 101 (March 7, 2018) ,
availabk at h[[ps: lltimesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/ india -busi ness/over-22000indian-websi tes-hacked-between-apr-2017 -jan- 20 181arricleshow/63203998.cms (Last
visited on April 25, 2018).

38

5.69 B ITA 2008, Power to authorise co monitor and collect traBic data or information
th rough any computer resource for cyber security - a) enhan ce cyber secu rity and
for idenrification, b) analysis and prevenrion of intrusion or c) spread of computer
conraminam in the coumry.

Rule 3, s.69 B Traffic Data RulLs 2009, on Directions for monitoring for any or all of the
following purposes rdated to cyber securiry;(a) forecasting of imminent cyber incidents; (b)
monitoring network application with traffic data on com purer resource; (c) idenrifica tion
and determination of viruses or computer contaminam;(d) tracking cyber security breaches
or incidents; (e) tracking computer resource breaching cyber security or spreading virus
120
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ITA 2008 introduced s.66F as whoever blocks, hacks, contaminares computer
and gains or obrains unaurhorised access to resrricted informarion wirh an

inrenrion CO attack securiry of the stare.39
•

Apart from the above-mentioned IT Rules 2009, in which agencies are required
to ger prior authorisation , there are some orher laws from where agencies get

blanket access (access without any prior authorisarion). It was introduced under
IT Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Semitive Personal Data or

Information Rules, 2011 [hereafrer s.43A Rules 2011 ] which provides rhe srare
rhe power to obrain sensitive personal data. Along wirh thar, ir introduced rules,
which are distinct from earlier ones. The procedutal standards and safeguards
were diluted with the innovation of blanker aurhorisation access to sensirive
dara wirh the removal of impediments such as the court or execurive order.
Though it would srare rhe purpose for accessing informarion, irs utilisation
contains broad and generic purposes such as: verificarion of identity, or for
prevention, derection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution,
and punishment of offences.' o
The rapid growth of interner also brought massive expans ion of virtual service
providers (ISP, search engines, online payment sites, online-aucrion sires,
online marker places and so on). Hence, the Intermediary Guidelines Rules,
2011 (hereafrer s.79 Rules 2011) were introduced to regulare them . Although
prior existence of s.79 in JTA 2009 exempted the intermediary from liability.
However, the s.79 Rules 2011 were brought to bring more clarity. Here, the
intermediary is exempted until rules are complied, for which they were supposed
to remove unlawful content from their platform. Despite being severely debated

or computer contaminants; (f) identifyin g or tracking of any person who has breached ,
o r is suspected of having breached or being likely to breach cyber security;{g) undertaking
forensic o f the concerned computer resource as a parr of investigation or internal aud it of
info rmation security practices in the computer resources; (h) accessing a stored in form ation

for enforcement of any provisions of the laws relating to cyber security for the time being
in force; (i) any ocher matter relating

[0

cyber security.

39 s.66FITA 2008 Punishmm t for cyber urramm.
40

Rule 6(1 ) in s.43A Rules 2011.
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after its emergence, it is one of the salient features for the state. According to
these rules, the intermediary is supposed to preserve information, which is
"stored or hosted or published" in their platform "for at least ninety days for
investigation purposes."" They are also supposed to provid.e information to any
authorised agency, and the purpose of obtaining such information varies from
"verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution,
cyber security incidents and punishment of offences."

IQJIOII - - .

"'" - -
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Number of Requests by rhe Indian Government to Intermediaries"
Even Cyber Cafes were brought under its ambit of surveillance through the
Guidelinesfor Cyber Cafe Rules 2011. It says "[to] not allow any user to use its
computer resource wirhout rhe identity of rhe user." And "the cyber cafe shall
keep a record of the identification" which includes log Jegister, log records
(history of websites and proxy servers), including users being photographed by
41

s.3(4)79 Rules 20 II.

42

Account information requests, TWIlTER. available athtcps: lltransparency.rwiner.com/enl
co untrieslin.html (Last visited on May 9, 2018); Rrquests for UUI' information, GOOCL£,
available ath rrps:!1 tcansparencyreport.google .coml user-dataloverview?user_ ceq uests_
report_period=authority: IN (Last visited on May 9, 2018); Requests for data, FACEBOOK,
available athrrps:/ltransparency.facebook.com/counrry/India/20 17-H 1/ (Last visited on
May 9,2018).
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the web camera, and all of them would be stored for at least one year, along
with the monthly disclosure of log register to the agency. It "facilitates both
reactive access and proactive disclosure to the authorised agencies."43 On these
Cyber Cafe rules, DietY lamented, "many of the things happen only from
the cyber cafe. They are not able to trace the person who enters, who uses
the system. So, it is precisely for the police requirement, security requirement
that we have to prescribe the data ..... .This is only for one year that one has to
maintain the records."44
The abovementioned legal regime emerged under a particular context of
liberalisation and globalisation in the late 19'h and early decades of 20,h
centuty. In the meantime, the New Telecom Policy in 20 12 brought significant
changes in aftermath of terror attacks. Major inclusion from the state was to
get communication assistance for their Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) for
security purposes. Both the ISP Licence's and Unified Licence'6 agreement are
legally grounded in the Telegraph Act, which gives immense power to the state
for lawful interception and monitoring facilities on telecommunications." In
October 2013, license terms were amended in line with the state decision to
set up a Central Monitoring System (CMS) to facilitate lawful interceptions."
It was a crucial development, as it linked technological innovations with legal
innovations for surveillance.

43

Sunil Abraham and Elonnai Hickok, Government access to private-sector data in India ,
2(4) iNlERNA'nONALDAl>.

P~ VACY

LAw 302, 306 (2012).

44

Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Lok Sabha, 3 1st Report on IT Rules 2011, 65
(2013).

45

DoT, Lianse Agreement for Provision oflntrmet Servia!, availabk athttp://tikona.in/s itcs/
visited on
July 17, 201 7)
default/ files/pdCus in~mpdf/l. ISP%20Agreemem%20Doc umem.pdf (Last

46

DoT, Lic",,, Agrmnmtfor Unified Licemr, avaii4bk athttp: //www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/
filesI2016_03_30%20UL.AS·Lpdf (Last visited on July 17, 2017)

47

ISP Clause 34·35, UASP Clause 39·41. Supra note 43, at 308.

48

DoT, Amendment to the Unified Licrnu Agreement regarding Central Monitoring System
2016, avaii4bk at http: //www.dot.gov.in/s ites/def.mlt/files/DOC231 0 13.pdf (Last visited
on August 14, 20 17)
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2-3 Technological Innovations for Cybersurveillance

"Ifyou're lookingfor the needle in a haystack, you have to have the haystack. "
-James Cole (US Deputy Attorney General)"
Apart from legal innovations discussed above, there had been numerous
technological innovations to address challenges of security, terrorism and even
prevention of ordinary crime. In 2009, to grapple with the precarious situation,
the Indian government proposed to launch Central Monitoring System. Now, it
is equipped with unmatched capabilities for carrying out rnetadata surveillance
of communication data (mobile, landline and internet)."· This technological
system is interlaced with the existing lawful interception an d mon itoring regime
under Telegraph Act,51 marking an establishment of cybersurveillance in India.
Presently, the issues surrounding national security in cyber space is a major
concern; however, it was not the major objective during early years of 2000s.
In lO'h Five Year Plan (2002-07), it was merely given a cursory attention on
the IT security and cybercrimes issues. 52 It was only during the subsequent
five year plans, serious steps were taken on cyber security issues. In II 'h FYP
(2007-2012), the government began taking proactive steps "for security of the
telecom and data networks and to provide useful inputs to the national security
49

Officials eire thwarud pum, ovmight in tkfonding sUTVeilianc<, CNN Ou ne 13,2013),
available at https: lledition.cnn.comI2013/061l8/politics/nsa-leaks (Las t visited on May
3,2018).

50

SAc.in, India; Survrillanc< State, (2014), available amttps: lIs Ac.in/si tes/default/filesl
wp-content/ uploads/2014 /09/SFLC-FINAL-SURVEILLAN C E-REPORT.pdf (Last
visited on Match 17,2018); MariaXynou and Elonnai Hickok , "Security, Surveillance
and Data Sharing Schemes and Bodies in India," (20 15), available at https:llcis-india.
aegl j n(emer-gave mance/blog!securi ry -surveillance-and -data-shari ng. pdf (Last vi si ted on
March 17,2018).

51

"The interception and monicocing of any target under eMS can be done only after
following the due process of/aw as stipulated in the Section 5(2) fIndian Telegraph Act,
1885 read with Rule 419-A ofIndian Telegraph (Amendment) Rules, 2007." Statement
ofMilind Deora, Rajya Sabha Debates (August 23,2013).

52

Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-07, Volume II: Sectoral Policies and Programmes, available
amttp:11 planningcommission. gov.inl plansl plamel/fiveyr/ 1Oth/volume2/1 Oth_ vol2. pd f
(Last visited Oct 12,2016).
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agencies." To prevent "the undesirable elements and minimize the security
hazards . . . ," therefore, it envisioned CMS." However, it became reality in 12,h
FYP (2012-2017), where it was clearly mentioned with an elaborate proposal
for execution and maintenance of CMS because "security agencies would like
to intercept and monitor the communication made by these threat elements. ";'
The 26/ II terror attack exposed several weaknesses in India's intelligence
gathering and action nerworks. Hence, NATGRID was launched to as an
IT tool "to access, collate, analyse, correlate, predict and provide speedy
dissemination" of information from 21 categories (such as telecommunications,
Banking, Airlines, etc.) which would be shared with intelligence agencies. ;; It
is essentially 'dataveillance,' wherein the users' actions or communications are
monitored and investigated, through which they can be tracked, monitored,
intercepted and traced. 56 In addition, another comprehensive and integrated
mechanism CCTNS was launched in 2009 to digitally connect all the police
stations and digitising all records. This is to modernise policing and security
management by providing necessary tools, technology and information to
facilitate investigation of crime and detection of criminals.
To facilitate efficient delivety of welfare services, the government unveiled
biometric marking Unique Identification Number (UID) or Aadhaar card,
53

Report of the Working Report on the Telecom Sector fot the 11 - Plan (2007-2012),
http: //p lanningcommission.gov.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp ll/wgll _
telcom.pdf (Last visited Oct 12, 2016).

availabl~ at

54

"The antisocial or anrinarional e1emems can use the commu nication facilities either
to communicate their plans, coordinate and execure the crime or they can attack the
network , steal the confidemial or private information contai ned in the network devices
or flowing through the network. These twO types of threats require distinct and different
handling of the issues. " Report of the Working Report on the Telecom Sector for the 12'h

Plan (20 12-201 7), available at http: //planningcommission.gov.in/abourus/committee/
wtkgrp 12/c it/wgrep_ te!ecom.pdf (last visited Oct 12, 2016).
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Statement of Kiren Rijiju, Rajya Sabha Debates, Uuly 16,2014). In 2015, it was held
that "NATGRID does not have mandate co have reai · time access co all citizens' details ...
with the click of a mouse co crack terror act ivities." Statemenr of Haribhai Parthibhai

Chaudhary, Raj ya Sabha Debates (Match 4, 2015).
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which contains a standard form of 12-digit identity number (the next section
would deal with issues surrounding Aadhaar). It allows interlacing technologies
and different mechanisms that serve a range of desires, including those for
security, governance, and much more. For instance, the interlocking biometric
card with National Intelligence Grid and the National Population Register57
form a vast database, which can be shared with variolls other intelligence
agencies. Even state government is employing Aadhaar fo r the purpose of
prevention of crimes. For instance, Telangana police person nel are using Aadhaar
to generate a 'golden record' by interlinking it with different data points. 18
If it lacks any sort of key data point, then it is collected from ci tizen survey
database. 19 Such an interlocking and convergence reAects that the government
can em ploy data for a range of purposes. This is because it is not restrained
to merely efficient delivery of welfare services. Haggerty and Ericson captured
these multiple, overlapping governing practices, with different capabilities and
purposes, as a "surveillant assemblage. "'"
Another surveilling mechanism is NETRA, an Internet monltonng system
capable of keyword-based detection, a monitoring, and pattern-recognition
system for packetized data and voice traffic in Internet world 6l In 2016 ,
National Security Council Secretariat proposed to establish a National Media
Analytics Centre (NMAC) which will track, monitor, analyse the online content
(blogs, web portals ofTY chan nels and newspapers, and social media platforms
57

The pilot project UIO commenced

to

provide unive rsal idencity and remove ghosr-

beneficiaries, now it is being linked with NPR data to find our ghost residents. Gov~rnmmt
out to match Aadhaar, NPR data , INOIAN ExP IlESS, Ouly 6, 2015), available at hrrp: /1
ind ianexp ress.com /arricleli ndialindia-others/governmenr-o m -to-march-aadhaar-nprdatal (Last vis ited on December 3, 201 7) .
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Break the law, and you invite unwanted attention, THE H INOU (May 13, 20 18), available
at hrrp:llwww.thehindu.com/ todays-paper/ tp-national/tp-telanganalbreak- the-Iaw-andyou -invire-unwanted-artemion/ article23869570.ece (Last visited May 15 . 2018).
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A few months after its creation in 2014, the Telangana state launched 'Imens ive Household
Survey' to enumerate and ascertain rhe details of people living in rhe srare.
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Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard v: Eticson, "The Surveillant As, emblage," 51 (4) British
Journal of Sociology (2000).
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such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, among others) to counter
news and comments that it decides are negative or provocative.· 2 In August
2017, a new surveillance mechanism was introduced named 'Project Insight.'

It is purported to collect big data to unearth tax evasion which may have gone
undetected without technology. It amasses non-intrusive information, which
would be mined, cleaned and processed by data analytics . Later, it will be used
to create individual spending profiles and precisely target inquiries. In short, it
is economic profiling of every individual, which would improve tax compliance
and effective utilization of information in tax administration. 63
Real-time access ro data is becoming new mantra for governance. In January
2017, Telangana State Police launched Sakala Nerasthula Samagra Survey for
enumerating and geo-tagging all repeat offenders in their state. Here, the data
being collected includes photographs, biometric fingerprints and geo-tagging
the location of the criminals and their associates. Their press release says,

"A matrix ofall the databases so prepared will give a 360 degree profile
of all the offenders and their current activities.. This will enable the
police officers to mount a continuous surveillance over the criminals
and monitor their activities by accessing information in realtime while
on the field duty. Technology tools like Big Data Analytics shall be used
to proactively predict and prevent crime, in addition to detection of
crimes already occurred. " 64
Most of our communication has an integral component of end-to-end
encryption, and apart from this, it is widely used in our daily transactions,
62

Now, govt cyb<r ,,1/ to coun«,. 'n<gative' nnus, I NDIAN Ex!' IUS (February 26, 2016), available
at hnp:11indianexpress.coml article/ind ialindia- news-i ndial now-govt -cyber -ce ll-tocoumer-negative-news/ (LaSt visited on July 17, 201 7)

63

ncome Tax Department signs contract with LerT In/ouch Ltd for implementation of

Projm Insight, PIB (July 19, 2016) , available at h[[p: ll pib.nic.in/ newsite/ PrintRelease.
aspx?relid= 147283 (Last visited on July 17,2017).
64

Telangana State Police, Press Raeau: TtianganaStauwideSakaiaNerasthulaSamagra
Survey (January 17 , 2018), availabl, at http: //www.cyberabadpolice.gov.in / pressrelease/TELANGANAO/020STATEWIDEO/020SAKALAO/020NERASTHULAO/020
SAMAGRAO/020SURVEY.pdf (Lasr visited on May 13, 2017).
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making it indispensable in this age of privacy invasions. Yet, there is lack of
legal consensus over encryption policy, because it is the government which is
supposed to prescribe methods for encryption under s.84A ofITA 2008. The
consultation ptocess on national encryption policy (NEP) was in itiated way
back in 2009 under the direction of Department of Information Technology
(DIT) . The committee expressed the need to access unencrypted data (plain
text) for Law Enforcement Agencies (hereafter LEA). After some time it went
into state of abeyance. Meanwhile, Blackberry was warned Iwice - first in 2008
and again in 2010 - by the government to either ptovide access to securiry
agencies to monitor the information on their services or face ban, and finally, it
had agreed to ptovide access to partial services. 6s The issue was strong 256-bit
encryption technique used by BlackBerry, which makes it difficult to intercept
or decipher messages . Similar problems were faced with other services such
as Nokia Pushmail, Skype, Yahoo, Gmail among others, , aid Milind Deora,
the then Minister of State in the Me lT. He held the "securiry Agencies
have intimated that they are not able to decrypt some encrypted intercepted
communication to readable format."66
These discussions again resurfaced, when DietY released Draft National
Encryption Policy on September 21, 2015. One of the bjectives was "to
synchronize with the emerging global digital economy, network sociery and use
of Encryption for ensuring the securiry, confidential iry of data and to protect
privacy in information and communication infrastructure without unduly
affecting public safery and National Securiry."6? However, (he moment it was

65

In 2010, government asked Blackberry [0 provide access to monitor their communication

service. For which the company gave partial access to BlackBerry Messenger (B8M) and
BlackBerry Internet Service (SIS) email , but it denied access to BlackBerry Enrerprise
Service. Government, BlackBerry md dispult over inuraption of BB devius. EcoNOM Ie
TIM E.S Uuly 10,2013) availabk at https:/leconomicrimes.indi.uimes.comlindusrfy/
(eleeo m I gove rn m en t - black be rry-e n d -d i sp u te-ove r- i nte rcep ti 0 n - 0 f- b b-devi cest
articleshowl20995830.cms (Last visited on March 19,2018).
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Statement of Milind Deora, Lok Sabha Debates (March 14,2012).
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DietY, Draft National Encryption Policy, 2015, availabk at httpsllnetzpolitik. org/wpupload/draft-Encryption-Policyvl.pdf (Last vis ited on March 19, 2018).
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released in the public realm , it became controversial and was severely debated
and criticised. Contrary to its own objective, the provision required to keep a
plain text copy of the data which would be stored for 90 days from the date of
the transaction, and whenever demanded, such data would be made available
for LEA. It included all users, government personnel and business organisations.
Later, an addendum was released for clarification, exempting social media
(WhatsApp, Facebook, Twiner etc.), online payment gateways and e-commerce
and password-based transactions from this policy."' Due to severe ambiguiry
and several criticisms from different stakeholders and civil sociery, the draft
was withdrawn .G9 IT Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad said, "I understand that
the manner in which it was wrinen co uld lead to misconceptions. I have asked
for the draft policy to be withdrawn and reworded. I personally feel some of
the expressions used in the draft are giving rise to uncalled-for misgivings . ..
Experts had framed the draft policy. It is not the government's final view. "' ·
3. CYBERSURVEILLANCE UNDER DEMOCRACY: EMERGING
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
Around the world, the development of modern sophisticated communication
technologies is posing serious challenges to the governments. So, they are facing
the most complex menaces of global terrorism, along with the proliferation of
modern crimes commined via cyberspace. For instance, social media became a
crucial platform for expansion and radical isation of terrorism across the globe
68

DietY, Proposed Addendum to the Draft Encryption Policy, 2015, available at naavi.orgl
uploads_wp/darification_nep_v l.pdf (Lasr visited on March 19,2018).

69

On September 22, 2015 , DietY said that it "has noted public sentimems vis-a-vis thi s
draft. It is hereby clarified that the above ment ioned draft is not the final view of [h e
Government on the matter . . .. [and] has also taken note of the ambiguity in some portions
of the draft that may have led to misgivings. Hence, the above mentioned draft has been
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Policy of Government,

PIB (September 22, 2015), available athttp: //pib.nic.i n/ newsite/
PrinrRelease.as px' relid= 127106 (Last visited on March 19, 2018).
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GOllt presus 'undo' button on draft mcryption policy, B USINESS SlJ\NOAJO (Seprember 23,
2015), available at http: / /www.business-scandard .com/article/econo my-policy/gov[presses-undo-button-on-draft-encryption-policy- 11 509220 10 14_l.html (Last visited
May 6,2018).
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and also in India. The first cyber terrorism case in India appeared in 2014
when 24-year-old Mehdi Masroor Biswas was arrested for aiding and abetting
an ISIS terrorist organisation through his Twitter account @ShamiWirness.
He was arrested under sections 125 ofIPC, 18 and 39 of UAPA and 66F of
the ITA.7l Apart from his case, there were several other cases of radicalisation
through social media, which are in the process of investigation and trial.72
Along with the issues of terrorism, there are also the proliferation of crimes
which are being committed via cyberspace. For instance, in August 2017, the
Mumbai Police Crime Branch busted two illegal phone exchanges in Mumbai
where the Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) facility was being misused. 73
On the one hand, it causes loss of revenue to the state as it avoids international
tariff, and on the other hand, it raises serious concerns over its usage for
tertorism and illegal activities. For governments, the major challenge with regard
to sophisticated technologies (such as VoIP, Darkernet, Cryptocurrencies) is
different from centralised communication network. Here, it is the decentralised
communication network, which makes it difficult to identify, locate and trace
the perpetrators. Hence, governments are making a shift from governance based
on traditional surveillance mechanisms to data-driven governance, i.e., big-data
cybersurveillance. The discussion in the previous section is a testimony to how
India's cybersurveillance architecture is getting unfolded.
Along with India, major democracies around the world are facing serious
threats and dangers to security and societal tranquillity. In this scenario, state
surveillance is tailored as a legitimate defence to protect democracy and freedom .

71

Mehdi Biswas, ISIS; voice on Twitter, arrested in Bengaluru,

lDI

(December 14, 2014)

available at http://timesoflnclia.indiatimes.com/indial mehdi-bisw3S-isiss-voice-on-rwitter-

arrested-in-bengaluru/articleshow/45509074.cms (Last visited on December 18, 2017).
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Several cases of radicalisarion through social media are registered in various Police Stations
of NIA. NIA Cases, available at hrrp: /Iwww.nia.gov.in/nia-cases.htffi (Last visited Oct
14,201).
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Illegal phone exchanges thriving on SIM boxes, THE HINDU (Novem er 11, 2017) available
athttp: //www.thehindu.com/news!cities! mumbai/illegal-phone-exchanges-thriving-onsim-boxes/article20239988.ece (Last visited on December 3, 2017)
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Despite severe opposition against surveillance, there is also a widespread support.
Because it becomes near impossible to penetrate complex criminal and terrorist
organisations through more traditional police work. Moreover, it is often
regarded as an imperative for a functioning democracy to curtail the illegal
behaviours and activities, which can pose a threat to democratic institutions.
Conceptually, surveillance and democracy as concepts are antithetical, complex,
contextual and multifaceted. Nevertheless, their existence makes a significant
impact on our lives. making it critical to understand the complexity of the
relationship between each other. Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas argue
that democracy involves a system of open ptocedures for making decisions, in
which all members have an equal right to speak, have their opinions counted,
and also for protecting individuals from the corrupting effects of power. Further,
they assert that one of the significan t things about democratic governance
and surveillance is that the democracies are accountable to their citizens."
Contrariwise, in India, during post 9/11 and 26/11 scenarios, interception
provisions penetrated through a series of legislative reforms, which received
lackadaisical parliamentary debate on their merits and demerits. Although.
civil sociery constantly raised serious question s surrounding legality and
constitutionality of mass cybersurveillance architecrure.
Aforementioned developments most importantly abridge the fundamental
rights and freedom recognised in the constitution. However. it got complicated
due to the sheer absence of constitutional recognition of the right to privacy,
which got supplemented with statutory silence in privacy protection and data
protection laws in India. The constitutional void finally ended with a historic
judgement delivered in August 2017 by the nine-judge constitution bench
in justice K5. Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union ofIndia recognising constitutional
right to privacy. Here. the court, instead of confining privacy merely under
the ambit of Article 21, gave a wider expression by defining the mutual
relationship of privacy with the galaxy of other rights and liberties under Part
III of Indian constitution. In such a relationship, privacy was recognised as a
74
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stepping-stone, as Chandrachud J. said, "Privacy constitutes the foundation of
all liberty, because it is in privacy that the individual can decide how liberty is
best exercised."75 Similarly, Bobde J.: "Privacy in all its aspects constitutes the
springboard for the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1). "76
With such a wider expression , privacy cannot merely be regarded as solitude;
rather it also involves protection against any sort of unteasonable and arbitrary
invasions on individual freedom. In the case of cybersurveillance, where the data
is hoarded unreasonably and arbitrarily in order to monitor, control and govern,
it clearly strikes at the issue of its constitutionality. Because, it does not merely
violate the freedom of personal liberty under Article 21 , but also the freedom
of speech, expression and thought under Article 19. The re is concomitant
relationship between them on this, as Chandrachud J. said, 'The intersection
between one's mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to freedom
of thought, the freedom to believe in what is right, and the freedom of selfdetermination. " 77 Similarly, in a separate opinion Kaul J. also held, "Privacy is
also the key to freedom of thought. A person has a right to think. The thoughts
are sometimes translated into speech but confined to the person to whom it
is made."78 The emerging technological innovations for surveillance strikes at
the constitutionality of mass surveillance.
The Supreme Court in Puttaswamy case and Binoy Virwam case found the merits
and agreed to the legitimate interest of the state surveillance. In the fo rmer case,
the court mentioned the following grounds for exemptions, such as, "protecting
national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation
and the spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipatio of social welfare
benefits."79 They even emphasised how "the seamless structure of the web can
be exploited by terrorists to wreak havoc and destruction on civilised societies.
75

(2017) 10 sec I Plurality opinion. 243.

76

(20 17) 10 sec I BobdeJ. opinion. 28.

77

(2017) 10 see I Plurality opinion. 244.

78

(2017) 10 see I Kaul J. opinion. 26.
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(2017) 10 sec I Plurality opinion. 265
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Cyber attacks can threaten financial systems."'o In the latter, the court held
Aadhaar would facilitate "unearthing [of] black money or checking money
laundering ... [also] law enforcement agencies ro take care of the problem of
terrorism ro some extent and may also be helpful in checking the crime and
also help investigating agencies in cracking the crimes."" On linking PAN with
Aadhaar, they argued the "seeding of Aadhaar number into PAN database will
allow a robust way of de-duplication" and "weed out any undetected duplicate
PANs.""
Instead of looking at it narrowly as a privacy issue, it would be effective if we
look into broader issues ro canvas deeper problems. The issues such as, what are
the goals of state surveillance? What degree of penetration is proportional and
reasonable? In this scenario, the major challenges for democracy and surveillance
appears around constitutionalism and rule of law. Such as, how ro maintain
institutional restraints and insulate fundamental liberties from oppressive
actions by the state? Similar ro privacy not being absolute, the state surveillance
is also not absolute in its scope. Because the perils of unlawful surveillance
on the individual right to privacy was a real concern, hence, limitation
principles were proposed in several moments. Shah committee suggested three
principles - proportionality, legality and necessity. Similarly, the judgement also
chalked out such limitation principles, but there was difference of opinions.
Chandrachud J. plural opinion laid out a three-fold requirement - legality,
need and proportionality'3 There was an add-on as Kaul]. mentioned another
requirement: procedural safeguard. 84 Chelameshwar J. along with limitations in
Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21 also added one more requirement - highest
standard of scruriny." 5 Even BN Krishna committee in their provisional view
recommended ro have effective review mechanisms and held that exemptions
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and privacy need ro be "skilfully balanced. "86 Some of these principles strike
similarity with the International Principles on the Application ofHuman Rights
to Communications Surveillance which was released in 201 4.'7
In the aftermath of 9/11, several legal changes occurred in a decade, which
David Jenkins calls as a "long decade,"88 where legal systems evolved in reaction
ro global terrorism. In this decade, these notions were transformed, in response
ro changing threats ro national security. To evade unpredictable catastrophic
risks, uncertain and unanticipated threats, or any extra-ordinary and emergency
situations, the government created discretionary space t respond ro these
situations. David Dyzenhaus explores this discretionary space and emergency
laws as legal "black holes" and "grey holes. " In black hole, law would "either
explicitly exempt the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or
explicitly exclude judicial review of executive action."" In the above discussion,
there were wide sort of exemptions for executive interception and evidence.
Lisa Austin argues the rationale behind the "exemptions from the ordinary
operation of the law ro uphold the law more generally; otherwise, individuals
could hide behind the law ro avoid prosecution for their illegal behaviour. "'"
Even the exclusion from judicial review rook place when Supreme Court in
20 16, dismissed PIL from NGO Centre for Public Interest Litigation ro bring
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accountability and transparency in the functioning of intelligence agencies.
Ie validated the legal black hole, as major intelligence organizations and
surveillance infrastructure persist without any legal basis or statucory existence.
The court held that "they are bound co have secrets, " and further argued that
judicial scrutiny over the functioning of these agencies would "create a dent"
in the security'l Dyzenhaus calls such a discoutse as would literally mean,
"there is no law."92

While grey hole, in contrast, is a form of law where "there are some legal
constraints on executive action .. . but the constraints are so insubstantial that
they pretty well permit government co do as it pleases. "93 In above-mentioned
discussion, the procedural lapses and lack of political will co have public scrutiny
makes these laws defunct. Dyzenhaus considers it as merely "the facade or form
of the rule oflaw rather than any substantive pcotections. "" Because they are
so insubstantial, deficient and inadequate CO pcovide substantive pcotections
fcom pocential dangers and corrupt uses of power. Instead of exceptions just
remaining pcoportionate and narrow, they have rurned out as what Austin
says, "the exception swallows the rule, " allowing LEA "co operate outside of
the ordinary operation of the law. "

Ie was during this "long decade, " several scholars have tried co understand
the narure of surveillance state, and the dilemma between security and liberty
- whether it needs co be balanced between each other or traded off. Jeremy
Waldcon cautions about giving up our civil liberties; he states, "we must be sure
that the diminution of the liberty will in fact have the desired consequence.""
Reducing liberty consequently increases the power of the state, which may be
91
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used to cause harm or diminish liberty in other ways. The matter of suspicion
of power under the state is seldom ever used, only for emergency purposes
and always liable to abuse. Instead of trading off liberties for purely symbolic
purposes and a consequential gain, there should be assessments about the
effectiveness of such trade-offs .. In similar vein, instead of ptoposing trade-off
ofJiberty in the name of security, which strictly is a zero-sum trade-off,96 Daniel
Solove criticises failute in properly assessing the balance between privacy and
security. Instead, he argues that the real balance should b" between "security
measure with oversight" and "regulation and security measute at the sole
discretion of executive officials. "97
In December 2015, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) conducted
a special meeting on "Preventing Terrorists from Exploiting the Internet and
Social Media to Recruit Terrorists and Incite Terrorist Acts, while "Respecting
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" by bringing together several
countries, stakeholders, partners and organisations. It was held that appropriate
legal, institutional and administrative frameworks are required to respond to the
threat, along with the rights to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference
with privacy, and freedom of expression should be protected. by law. Also, it was
held that there is urgent need to promote dialogue between all stakeholders,
including industry and civil society representatives, and seek to develop policies
that favour the free flow of information along with securiry."
The values under which social networking emerged is under peril; hence,
cooperation is indispensable for its very own existence which is in danger.
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The robust partnership is required especially from the private seeror and
among the states to assist in providing their technical expertise, software tools
and provide evidence for prosecution. Ir is a critical moment where efforts to
undermine encryption on one side may do more harm to individuals than
disabling terrorists who can easily discover ways to circumvent restrictions. 99
In other words, insecuriry in one place, leads ro insecuri ry across networks;
rherefore, undermining encryption may do little to prevent terrorist activiry,
but it disproportionally interferes and abridges individual liberty. With regard
ro liberry and privacy, the laws and proposals for communication surveillance
need to meet the limitations principles and standards.

CONCLUSION
The advancements in digital and communication technologies brought our
profound changes in the nature of surveillance, which consequently produced
persistent fears on the functioning of democracy, constitutionalism and rule of
law. The expansion of such assorted forms of technological mechanisms and
proliferation of surveillance tech nologies in India led ro the emergence of a
cybersurveillance appararus. It opened the Pandora box of challenges to privacy
and democracy in India. This is because the government is equipped with
surveillance power not merely for exceptional circumstances such as counterterrorism, but also for ordinary circumstances. Ir shows a greater normalisation
of exceptional power in everyday lives.
In this pressing scenario , surveillance is considered as a legitimate means to
prevent burgeoning terrorism, along with emerging cybercrimes and even
ordinary crimes - making surveillance power quite complex and murky. Under
the present circumstances, the major challenge for democracy in India is to strike
a balance between often-corrosive surveillance measures with civil liberties.
H ere, one of the penultimate issues is whether a government can hoard and
amass huge amount of data of their citizens in the name of securi ty. Though
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the state has the power to intercept, monitor and surveil, these should be
narrowly tailored surveillance - functioning within the realm of limitations as
proposed by the Purraswamy judgement. The relationship berween surveillance
and democracy is a complex one, and it would be severely contested with the
emerging cybersurveillance mechanisms.
[Note: I would like to show my gratitude to Professor Ujjwal Kumar Singh,
University of Delhi, for his intriguing and inquisitive discussion on these issues.
I am thankful to Associate Professor A. Nagarathna, t\LSIU , for teaching
incisive nuances on cyber laws.]
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